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1 Introduction 
Is society's system for managing risks to life and limb, as Zeckhauser and Viscusi (1990) 
put it, deeply flawed? Do our public officials overreact to risks of low probability but high 
salience, such as those posed by nuclear power, disastrous chemical releases and natural 
disasters1, and put too little effort into ameliorating voluntary risks, such as those involv- 
ing automobiles, diet, and smoking? As worrying as technological and natural disasters 
are, most of those who die prematurely do not die from any sort of collective disaster, at 
least in industrialized countries. U.S. life expectancy statistics reveal that individual risks 
from "private killers" such as heart disease, cigarette smoking, obesity, and even 'being 
single' rank at least two to  three orders of magnitude over such catastrophic events as 
hurricanes and tornadoes, airline crashes, and accidents from the generation of nuclear 
energy. Are public expenditures to reduce or avoid low-probabilitylhigh consequence 
(LPIHC) events then flawed if this money could save more lives if spent elsewhere? 
Economists usually frame this question as an issue of risk aversion, where one asks i f  
the simultaneous death of 100 people is worse than the isolated deaths of 100 otherwise 
identical people. A close cousin of this risk-aversion concept is a concern not for collective 
deaths, but for avoiding a "worse-case" eventuality even if the deaths are private and 
i n d i~ id ua l .~  A predilection to avoid the possibility, even if remote, of a large number of 
"private" deaths has been viewed as a primary motivation for conservative tendencies in 
risk assessment procedures (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1986). 
Many view such risk-averse preferences as, at  best, irrational or uninformed, and, at 
worst, morally repugnant since the implication is that lives are valued differently whether 
'International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. This paper was also partly 
supported by the Center for Risk Management, Resources for the Future, Washington D.C. I sincerely 
thank Dominic Golding, Howard Kunreuther, David Ball and Louis Goossens for their suggestions and 
help. Of course, I take full responsibility for all views expressed in this paper. 
'The global losses from geophysical hazards (draughts, earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones) 
have been estimated to total an annual average of about 250,000 deaths and $15 billion in damage as 
well as costs of prevention (Burton, et.al. 1978). Not all potential disasters are very low-probability 
events. Before the 1989 California earthquake, the Federal Emergency Management Agency estimated 
that a major earthquake in California could be expected with a probability of from 2% to 5% per year. 
Estimated fatalities were in the order of from 3,000 to 23,000, much higher than what was experienced. 
FEMA also expressed the view that the nation was essentially unprepared for an earthquake with such 
devastation (FEMA, 1980). 
2Kasperson and Pijawka (1985) remind us, for instance, that the accumulated exposure of 8 to 11 
million U.S. workers to asbestos is expected to  result in as many as 67,000 workers dying prematurely 
each year. This number exceeds even the well-worn comparison of some 40 to 50 thousand annual fatalities 
from automobile accidents (National Safety Council, 1987). 
lost collectively or individually. The alternative is a risk neutral position where the 
guiding principle for social policy is to save as many lives as possible given the available 
resources. Reflecting on catastrophe avoidance, Lichtenstein, et.al. (1988) comment, "It 
seems more compelling to us that it is the moral obligation of our social decision makers to 
save as many lives as possible; that implies risk neutrality (p. 17). Zeckhauser and Viscusi 
also view risk neutrality as the remedy for "society's flawed risk-management practices". 
They advocate a lives-saved standard of value as the most effective means of promoting 
society's risk-reduction objective (p.248). 
While laudable, I show in this paper that this risk-reducing objective is not consistent 
with the welfare basis of the economist's benefit-cost analysis, unless it can be assumed 
that the primary concern of people in most risk contexts is maximizing their odds of 
survival. Zeckhauser and Viscusi assume this to be the case. Behavior that deviates 
from maximizing these odds illustrates, in their words, "the limits of human rationalityn 
(p. 559).3 The question they then pose is, uhow should we proceed once we admit that 
individuals do not correctly react to many risks?" (p. 248). Not all economists take this 
view.4 Among others, Freeman and Portney (1989) encourage economists to recognize 
that the public cares about more than simply the statistical magnitude of risks: "Until 
these concerns are acknowledged and incorporated in economic models, economists may 
dismiss as irrational responses that make very real sensen (p. 4). The more appropriate 
question appears then to be: How should we proceed once we admit that many individuals 
have a broader concept of risk than the probability of survival? 
I proceed by setting out a very simplified choice situation that illustrates two different 
concepts of risk aversion, both of which allow for deviations from a lives-saved objective, 
but which have different ethical considerations. I then ask how the economist, who follows 
the precepts of benefit-cost analysis, would evaluate the choice between risk neutrality 
and risk aversion. Since the economist's reasoning depends on how the affected individu- 
als, themselves, would decide, and since individual choice is often described as irrational, 
I examine the issue of rationality from different perspectives-decision analysis, cognitive 
psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology. I conclude that inconsistent personal 
risk choices should not disqualify public concerns and citizen choice as a legitimate input 
to policy decisions involving LP/HC events. At the same time, I question whether the 
precepts of benefit-cost analysis provide an acceptable normative decision rule for mak- 
ing controversial risk decisions. I illustrate these theoretical issues with policy example 
involving the transport of radioactive wastes through New York City. 
2 Two Versions of Risk Aversion 
Ever since Bernoulli's explanation in the 18th century of the famous Petersburg paradox, 
which centered around the question why most people will pay only a small amount for a 
gamble of infinite mathematical expectation, the concept of risk aversion has been with us. 
In the context of expected utility theory (which has been the most influential paradigm of 
individual decision making), if a person prefers a certain monetary payoff over a gamble 
with a greater expected payoff, this person is said to be risk averse. The explanation lies 
simply in the notion of diminishing marginal utility of monetary gains. 
3Early proponents of this irrationality argument have also included Hafele (1979), Starr and Whipple 
(1980), Maxey (1979), Comar (1979), and Cohen and Lee (1979). For a discussion, see Schrader-Frechette 
(1986). 
4See, for instance, Schultze and Kneese (1980); Lave (1989). 
Stripped of social and political context, the more controversial phenomenon of r i s ~  
aversion-where lives are at  s t a k e i s  analogous. A risk-averse individual would choose a 
policy resulting in ten anonymous deaths to a gamble with an expected loss of ten lives, 
but which offered a small probability of a large number of deaths. In this context, risk 
aversion is thus a preference for individual "statistical" deaths over more catastrophic 
events, even if expectations in terms of loss of life are the same. The flip side of risk 
aversion is a preference for avoiding collective disasters even if more lives could be saved 
with the same resources were they allocated to saving "statistical" persons. 
Closer scrutiny of the risk-aversion concept reveals, however, a number of perplexing 
issues of definition. What distinguishes, for example, an airline disaster from the daily 
disaster on our highways? Is the loss of 100 people from a plane crash or from the release 
of radioactive materials in New York City any more a disaster than 100 people dying 
individually in their automobiles, or 100 people dying from their exposure to asbestos, or 
from an earthquake? Is a disaster a disaster because of the proximity of the deaths in 
time and space, because of the commonality of the cause, or because of other factors such 
as the collective nature of the deaths? 
Multiple Fatalities and Collective Fatalities 
I suggest that there are, at  least, two dimensions to disasters and thus to risk aversion: 
an aversion to large numbers of deaths from a common cause and an aversion to collective 
deaths where the individuals have little influence or control over the outcome. While these 
two dimensions cannot be wholly separated from the host of psychological concerns found 
in the risk perception literature, such as control, dread, etc., the point is that risk aversion 
cannot be, or rather should not be, attributed only to what Green and Brown (1978) have 
called the "kill size". Concern only with the numbers of persons who are affected by a 
particular cause leads too readily to the moral objection of seemingly valuing lives more 
if they happen to  be lost in large numbers. 
These two versions of risk aversion can be appreciated by considering three risk situa- 
tions, A, B, and C, shown in Figure 1. RISK A exposes each of 1000 persons to an annual 
chance of death of 1/1000. In contrast, RISK B takes the form of a group lottery with a 
one in ten chance of 1000 persons being exposed to a rather high annual chance of death 
(1/100), and otherwise no additional risk. RISK C takes the form of a group lottery in 
which there is a 1/1000 chance of a disastrous event taking the lives of all 1000 persons, 
and a 999/1000 chance of no fatalities at all. If only one of the risks can be eliminated 
with the available funds, which risk should the public policy maker choose? 
Before proceeding, I acknowledge that these choices are highly abstracted versions of 
life-risking decisions pulled artificially out of any real policy context. The risks shown 
in Figure 1 show no ambivalence or uncertainty with respect to the probabilities. Full 
agreement is assumed in the point estimates. The outcome is one dimensional, and the 
deaths are assumed to occur to present generations. The age of the victims appears to 
be irrelevant, as is the way in which they die. Moreover, I am framing the risk issue as 
a matter of probability and magnitude, which may not be essential to public concerns 
about risky situations (Rayner, 1987). The justification for adopting this formulation is 
that it is precisely this abstraction that underlies much of the analytical discussion of risk 
aversion. My purpose is to show that the case for or against risk aversion is complex even 
when reduced to its simplest, context-free form. 
Figure 1 shows three simplified risk situations, each of which is equivalent with regard 
to expected outcome, namely one fatality. Yet, the choices differ in form. In the case of 
RISK A: [(1/1000)1. (1/1000)2. .  . , (1/1000)imo] = One expected fata l i ty  
1 (11.12.. . . ,  11000, 
RISK C: = One expected fa ta l i t y  
'Joo* < [01,02.. . .,010001 
Figure 1: Three Risk Situations Illustrating Risk Aversion. 
RISK A, which exposes each of 1000 persons to an annual chance of death of 1/1000, the 
probabilities are generated independently-each person flips his or her own coin. No one 
person's fate is conditional on the fate of the others. This could be a group of persons 
with high cholesterol where the annual chance of death from heart failure for any one 
individual is 1/1000, or it could be a group of high-risk drivers. The fatalities will likely 
be anonymous in the sense that little public attention will be focused on them. In contrast, 
RISK B takes the form of a group lottery with a one in ten chance of 1000 persons being 
exposed to a rather high annual chance of death (1/100), and otherwise no additional risk. 
RISK B is characteristic of a range of societal risks where if something were to happen 
(e.g., a release of radioactive materials in New York City, a chemical release such as what 
occurred at  Bhopal or Seveso, or a nuclear power accident such as at  Chernobyl), then 
there may be many deaths in the present or in the future. 
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1986) offer an intriguing contrast between Risk A and Risk B. 
Two chemicals are assumed equally effective in treating a medical condition, but which 
are suspected of being carcinogenic. Chemical #1 poses an annual risk of cancer of 1 /I000 
for each person. Administering this chemical to a group of 1000 people would result in a 
risk situation analogous to RISK A in Figure 1. The risk from chemical #2 is uncertain; 
there is a 90 percent chance that it is perfectly safe (no risk) and a 10 percent chance 
that it poses a risk of one in a hundred (10 times higher than chemical A). Administering 
chemical #2 to a group of 1000 people results in a situation analogous to RISK B in 
Figure 1. Should these two types of risks be evaluated equivalently? 
What if instead chemical #2 had a 99.9% chance of being perfectly safe and a 0.1% 
chance of killing the recipients outright? RISK C thus takes the form of a group lottery 
in which there is a 1/1000 chance of a disastrous event taking the lives of all 1000 persons, 
and a 999/1000 chance of no fatalities at all. Like RISK A, each person faces t,he grim 
prospect of a 1/1000 chance of death. Also like RISK A, the statistical expectation is one 
death. Unlike RISK A, however, the probabilities are not independently generated-one 
coin is flipped determining the fate of the entire group collectively. If we are told that one 
person is a fatality, we can safely assume that all 1000 are also fatalities. In such cases, 
the deaths usually (but not always as this example illustrates) occur simultaneously at 
one place and draw considerable public attention: the collapse of superhighway 19 in the 
1989 San Francisco earthquake, for example. 
Why might a person choose RISK A over RISK B and C? First, there is an unsettling 
collective or public dimension to RISKS B and C-a coin is flipped for the entire group 
determining to varying degrees the risk to each participant. Of course, "who throws the 
die" is statistically irrelevant when the decision is context free. While this distinction is 
of little or no importance in the artificial choice setting, it may have significance in a real- 
world context to the extent that a psychological premium is placed on probabilities that 
are generated individually: each person "spins his own wheel of fortunen, "determines 
his or her own fate". This 'personal control' is often coupled with additional factors that 
have proven salient to public concerns, for instance, involuntary and/or uncompensated 
risks, factors which also tend to  characterize RISKS B and C. Our second dimension of 
concern, the prospect of a disastrous, worst-case sort of outcome with multiple fatalities 
is also greater for RISK C than for RISK B, and still smaller for RISK A. 
The message is that,  even in this highly simplified example void of most real-world 
context, there are two distinct types of risk aversion: 
(i) Multiple-fatality risk aversion, which is an aversion to deaths in large numbers. This 
is sometimes referred to as societal risks, and 
(ii) collective-fatality risk aversion, which is a non-neutral valuation of the probability- 
generating process, where a preference is displayed for independent trials - for 
'individual", private risks over 'collective", public risks. 
As I will discuss in the next section, only the first concept is usually considered consistent 
with 'rational" choice, but it is exactly this "rational" dimension of risk aversion that has 
been challenged as ethically unacceptable. The second concept, the aversion to collective 
types of fates, may be more acceptable from an ethical standpoint, but is perhaps too 
often labeled as irrational. 
The Economist's Perspective 
Benefit-cost analyst asks if the benefits of a government policy or project outweigh the 
sacrifices society must make to have it, a proposition so obvious that many economists 
regard benefit-cost analysis as nothing more or less than common sense (Freeman and 
Portney, 1989). Of course, any normative tool for social choice or for determining which 
goods or services in a society should be provided and how they should be allocated has 
either an explicit or implicit moral f~unda t ion .~  
A positive benefit-cost ratio implies that the gainers from a policy choice are able to 
more than compensate the losers, even if this compensation is not actually carried out. 
This quasi-utilitarian rule, that the gainers gain more than the losers lose, is known as 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and is the main ethical premise of benefit-cost analysk6 It 
is not, however, the only premise since it is also important to decide what counts as 
gains and what counts as losses. A fundamental notion of economic welfare theory and 
thus of BCA is that each individual is the best judge of his or her own welfare, and, 
moreover, that each person pursues his or her own self interest (for a discussion of this 
assumption, see Sen, 1982). Individual preferences are revealed by choices in the market. 
Where there is no market for the goods or services being measured, and therefore no 
revealed preferences, their value can be measured according to what each individual is 
willing to pay for them or, alternatively, according to how much each individual must be 
compensated to go without them. These two different measures of value are discussed 
below. 
Benefit-Cost Analysis and Mortality Risk 
What do these ethical premises of BCA mean for the public policy maker who is con- 
templating which risk is most deserving of mitigation from the three risks (A, B, and 
C) shown in Figure l?  One popular way to proceed is to make another simplifying and 
very crucial assumption: The persons at risk are concerned only about their probability 
of survival. They are indifferent as to how they die as well as to the context in which 
these risks are set. In addition, only those people at risk are willing to pay to reduce the 
risks-family and friends are willing to contribute nothing. Looking again at Figure 1, 
risks A, B, and C pose an ez ante risk of death of 1/1000 for each of the 1000 people in 
5Boulding (1969) distinguishes a "moral proposition" from an individual taste in that the former is 
intended to apply to society more broadly (p.1.). 
6Schulze and Kneese (1980) point out that benefit-cost analysis is a special case of the utilitarian ethic 
where individuals' utility functions are linear with identical constant marginal utilities across individuals 
and where future utilities are identically discounted. Therefore, the Kaldor-Hicks rule does implicitly 
require interpersonal utility comparisons. 
the exposed group. The relevant question is how much each of the 1000 people is willing 
to pay to reduce this risk to zero. (For a graphical presentation, see the Appendix). The 
full value of mitigating each risk in Figure 1 would be the aggregate 'willingness to pay' 
summed over the 1000 individuals. 
Framed in this way, the economist's reasoning leads to a risk-neutral position. Since the 
risk reduction is the same in each case, WPT must also be the same. The risks in Figure 1 
are then equally deserving of reduction. Before examining this apparent risk neutrality on 
the part of the economist more closely, it is important to discuss two aspects of this result 
which one may find troubling. First, as Freeman (1989) has pointed out, mortality risk is 
viewed by economists as an ez ante exercise in the sense that policy makers should focus 
on the prospects before the uncertainty is resolved. According to Freeman (p.310), an ez 
ante social welfare function implies that social welfare is a function of changes in expected 
utility, that is, it reflects a concern with opportunity in the expected value sense, while an 
ez post social welfare function reflects a concern with outcomes. One can appreciate this 
distinction by examining the risks in Figure 1. The ez  ante measure is concerned with the 
value of reducing a 1/1000 risk over 1000 individuals; the ez post measure is concerned 
with the value of saving one life. Since value as measured by the necessary compensation 
would likely be infinite for the latter, Freeman and others advocate the ez ante measure 
as appropriate for benefit-cost calculations. 
This brings up a second difficult aspect of this type of valuation. Clearly a person 
facing certain (near-term) death would be willing to pay a very large sum to avoid this 
eventuality, perhaps much more than he or she is able to pay. That the value of risk 
changes is necessarily bounded by each individual's budget or wealth may be troubling 
for those who are unhappy with the current distribution of wealth, and, indeed, the 
BCA practitioner accepts the status quo as a legitimate starting point for the analysis. 
Moreover, many feel that public expenditures on health and safety should be independent 
of the wealth of the beneficiaries. The economist rightly points out, however, that society's 
resources are finite. A benefit-cost assessment is based on the notion of allocating society's 
scarce resources such that the benefits of risk reduction at the margin are just equal to 
the social costs of this risk reduction. 
While this logic is convincing in the aggregate, it may not be entirely appropriate for 
individual cases of risk reduction. Even those who advocate the WTP logic for valuing 
mortality risk may find the budget constraint inappropriate in some cases. In fact, BCA 
requires that a second criteria also be met before a project is recommended. This second, 
equally justifiable measure of value asks not what the individual is willing to pay for the 
risk reduction, but what he or she would have to be compensated if the risk reduction 
program were not undertaken. This is referred to as a person's willingness to accept 
(WTA). Most people would not accept even infinite compensation for certain immediate 
death, whereas they can only pay a finite sum to avoid this rather unpleasant prospect.7 
The higher the risk, the greater the deviation will likely be between a person's WTP and 
WTA. 
If the WTP and WTA measures lead to different results in the benefit-cost calculations, 
Mishan (1988, p.193) advises that the economist forego his or her mandate to recommend 
a course of action. Both measures must lead to the same result for unambiguous fulfillment 
of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. It follows-and this is generally not recognized-that the 
'Adams (1989) takes issue with the notion that individuals should be indifferent between an amount 
received or aid for marginal deteriorations or improvements in environmental quality respectively. It 
should be noted that this is true only at the margin, i.e. the slope of the indifference curve. It is not 
true for larger changes. 
economist can only justify use of the WTP measure for very small changes in mortality 
risks (see Linnerooth, 1982). 
Is the economist risk neutral? 
The risk-neutral outcome of the above analysis is not in any sense intrinsic to the economist's 
benefit-cost logic, but results solely from the assumption that the people at  risk are, them- 
selves, risk neutral. The two key assumptions that drive the risk-neutral result are: 
(1) The exposed persons are concerned only with their survival chances, and 
(2) only these exposed persons are willing to contribute to reducing the risks. 
Economists have long recognized that these assumptions are too restrictive. The way in 
which people die is important to them, as well as their pain and suffering8 and the concerns 
of friends and relatives. Interdependent utilities that take into account the suffering of 
friends and relatives can be accommodated by welfare theory and BCA; however, a more 
entractable problem is accommodating what Sen (1982) calls "committment", where the 
suffering of others does not affect a persons own welfare, but he or she is still prepared to 
pay to reduce it. Ideally, the economist would have direct information on WTP for each 
distinct risk situation and for each exposed population, but these valuations can be quite 
costly (Freeman, 1986). 
Lacking estimates on the many different types of risks that policy makers address, a 
natural way to proceed is to borrow a WTP measure from one risk context for the pur- 
pose of applying it to another, e.g., compensation for occupational hazards (Viscusi, 1978; 
Dardis, 1980; Marin and Psacharopoulos, 1982).' Yet, applying WTP measures across 
the board may be wholly inappropriate. At the least, adjustments to reflect differences 
in the population and the risk context are needed. Economists have generally focused on 
the more tangible aspects of the risk context in adjusting these measures, factors such as 
the age of the affected population, pain and suffering of those concerned, bereavement, 
and social disruption. Much less attention has been given to the concerns that character- 
ize "collective-fatality" risk aversion, such as the degree to which the risks are assumed 
voluntarily and the control one feels one has in the risk situation. The extent to which 
the economist remains loyal to the principle of risk neutrality will depend ultimately on 
the extent of these adjustments. Bailey (1980), for example, considers them to be minor: 
Although there is no rational case for spending a huge sum to avoid a 
death from one cause while refusing to spend a relatively small sum to avoid a 
death from another cause, it can be shown that rational, well-informed citizens 
do not equalize these incremental sums precisely in private choices. Hence a 
policy based on such choices will allow some, albeit minor, differences in these 
sums to remain. 
Bailey, like Zeckhauser and Viscusi quoted above, reflect a widely-held view of economists, 
that large deviations from risk neutrality on an individual level are irrational. In their 
'Zeckhauser (1976) has reasoned that catastrophic potential may actually reduce WTP in the aggre- 
gate since if whole families and communities die together, this reduces pain and suffering! 
gThis information might also be obtained by the "hedonic price" approach which compares, for ex- 
ample, property values of those in a risk area with those in safer areas, or by the "contingent valuation" 
approach where people are simply asked what they are willing to pay to avoid a risk in a specified context. 
Both methods have serious drawbacks, but even this imprecise information can be useful. 
view, policies based on individual choice are pushing policy makers irrationally into mak- 
ing decisions according to how many people will be frightened rather than how many will 
be killed (Fremlin; 1984). Framed in this way, the whole issue of risk-neutrality may be 
seen as resting on the question of individual rationality, which I turn to below. 
Risk Aversion, Risk Equity, and Rationality 
The economic concept of the 'rational personn is one who acts in his or her own self 
interest and maximizes his or her utility. If a person's behavior conforms to certain simple 
axioms, the existence of an ordinal utility function can be inferred from the individual's 
choices. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) extended this concept to choices under 
uncertainty. With a more complex set of axioms,1° the existence of a utility function with 
cardinal properties can be inferred from a person's choice among risky alternatives. The 
so-called weak and strong axioms of revealed preference assure that the "rational person" 
is an expected utility maximizer. (For a discussion and critique, see Sen (1982b).) 
The expected utility model of choice was the basis of an early challenge to risk aversion 
by Keeney (1980). Without questioning outright the morality of allowing risk-averse pref- 
erences to influence public choices, Keeney nonetheless questions the consistency of these 
preferences with other seemingly laudable goals for public, risk-management decisions; 
in other words, he questions their rationality. According to Keeney, a policy maker who 
makes choices in a manner consistent with the expected utility model cannot be both risk 
averse and at the same time display a preference for distributing risks in an equitable 
manner. Risk equity in this context means spreading risks as evenly as possible over the 
population. 
As a way of summarizing Keeney's argument, consider again a group of 1000 people, of 
which only two are exposed to a very high annual risk of death. We will call this RISK 
D which can be written as follows: 
RISK D: ((1/2)1, (1/2)2, 0s ,O ,...... Olooo) = 1 Expected Fatality 
Not unlike RISK A, B, and C in Figure 1, the statistical expectation of RISK D is 
one fatality. In sharp contrast, however, RISK D distributes the death warrants rather 
unevenly, or inequitably. Two of the 1000 individuals face a 50% chance of dying from 
the risk in question; the remaining 998 face no risk at all. A preference for risk sharing 
suggests that RISK A would be preferred to RISK D, or 
(1) A > D (Risk Equity). 
We can recall that risk aversion is consistent with the following preference: 
(2) A > B (Risk Aversion) 
A > C. 
Keeney's point is that (1) and (2) are inconsistent for anyone following the maxims of the 
EU model, according to which the attractiveness or value of a choice is summarized by 
its expected utility, or the sum of the utilities of each possible outcome weighted by their 
respective probabilities of occurrence. In other words, if A > D, then A 2( B and A # C. 
''These include the axioms of complete-ordering, continuity, independence, unequal probability and 
complexity. 
Without showing the formal proof, Keeney's conclusion can be understood as follows: 
The more inequitably the risks are spread, or the more they are concentrated among a 
few persons, the less likely is the chance of a large number of deaths or the chance of 
exceeding the statistical expectation (in this case, 1 fatality). RISK A, for all its virtues 
in distributing the risks over many people, still has a very small chance of a large number 
of deaths-the worst possible case is 1000 fatalities. In contrast, the worst possible case 
for RISK D is 2 fatalities. It follows that a preference for RISK A over RISK D on equity 
grounds is at the same time a preference for accepting the remote possibility of many, 
albeit isolated, deaths. This is consistent only with a risk-prone utility function. RISK 
A > RISK D implies risk proneness; RISK A > RISK B or C implies risk aversion. A 
person cannot be both risk averse and risk prone. 
For those who feel uncomfortable with this result, who perhaps wish to  stick with a 
preference ordering that has been ruled out as inconsistent or irrational by Keeney, namely, 
A > B > C > D, some more explanation may be called for. What drives Keeney's result 
is his full acceptance of the expected utility model. EU theory excludes the possibility 
of "collective-fatality" risk aversion, that is, it excludes the possibility that people prefer 
"controlling the oddsn or "flipping the coin themselvesn. Only 'multiple-fatality' risk 
aversion, or an aversion to accidents claiming many lives at  once, is permissible within 
the EU logic. EU theory dictates that only decision outcomes can have an associated 
utility. How the probabilities are generated (who flips the coin) cannot be a factor in 
a person's preference function." The notion of collective-fatality risk aversion, where 
an extra premium is placed on individual trials, is fully irrational in this context. No 
distinction can be made between 1000 deaths on the highway and 1000 deaths from a 
plane crash. It follows that the only variable of concern to Keeney's decision maker (who 
chooses between RISKS A, B, C, and D) is the probability distribution over fatalities. 
Keeney's concept of risk aversion translates then into the non-linear utility function over 
fatalities shown in Figure 3, where DU(2 deaths) > 2 DU(l death). l 2  
This illustrates the core of this discussion. If risk-averse preferences are based only 
on the notion of non-linear preferences as shown in Figure 2 (which is implicit in most. 
economic analysis), then the whole concept of risk aversion might easily be challenged, as 
indeed Keeney did, on moral grounds. This interpretation implies that one values lives lost 
collectively more than those same lives lost individually. But introducing another plausible 
concept of risk aversion, that people are not indifferent to how the odds are generated or 
the manner in which the risks are imposed, changes the argument. Sen (1982a) argues 
that this egoistic view of economic rationality is a consequentialist view: judging acts 
by consequences only (p. 104). Viewing the lotteries shown in Figure 1 only in terms 
of expected deaths is likewise consequentialistic and does not admit legitimate feelings 
about how the odds are generated. As Sen notes "Sometimes the lack of personal gain in 
particular acts is accepted by considering the value of rules of behavior. ... the exclusion of 
any consideration other than self-interest seems to impose a wholly arbitrary limitation in 
to notion of rationality" (p.104). The Nichols and Zeckhauser example (Risk B in Figure 1) 
is interesting from this perspective. The chemical in question poses either a very high risk 
"This type of preference is ruled out by the continuity axiom and the axiom of complexity. 
12Collective disasters (RISK C) rank lower than more individual disasters with the same expected 
deaths (RISKS A&B) for the simple reason that collective disasters have the additional property of 
skewing the probabilities toward more serious, 'worst case' outcomes (RISK C has a greater chance of 
1000 deaths than RISK B and RISK A). Risk A is preferred to Risk C, not because of the independent 
versus conditional nature of the probabilities, but because Risk A has a lesser chance of a large number 
of deaths than Risk C. 
(DIS) UTILITY 
FATALITIES 
Figure 2: Risk-Averse and Risk-Neutral Utility Functions 
(1/100) to each of the 1000 people exposed or no risk at all. The carcinogenity question 
will be resolved independently of the people involved-a kind of social or group lottery. 
If positive, then the risk of contacting cancer will likely be viewed as more individually 
determined, depending on a persons's immune system, lifestyle, age, etc.13 As such, RISK 
B is a hybrid of RISK A and C-partially a group lottery and partially independent trials. 
It may be this "group lottery" aspect of cancer-the exogenous chemical for which little 
is known and for which the individual has little control-that creates such anxiety about 
this particular disease. 
Yet this "collective-fatalityn version of risk aversion is a clear violation of the expected 
utility model, and, for this reason, might be considered irrational. This concept of irra- 
tionality is so closely tied to expected-utility maximization as a normative decision rule 
that it is important to ask if expected utility is an appropriate yardstick for decision ra- 
tionality. In a comprehensive review, Schoemaker (1982, p.548) concludes that EU theory 
fails as both a descriptive and predictive model since it does not take into account various 
psychological principles of judgement and choice. Very real factors that affect personal 
choices and are excluded by the EU model include, for instance, regret, ambiguity, and 
status quo biases.14 A wealth of variants to  the EU model exist that try to capture how 
people actually make risky choices. 
That individuals do not deal well with EU maximization might strengthen the case 
for more formal decision analysis (and more explicit risk-benefit tradeoffs) as a way of 
improving the suboptimal nature of intuitive, unaided decision making. In other words, 
those who prefer RISK A over RISK C in Figure 1 might appreciate being corrected so 
as not to be in violation of the EU model. Schoemaker, however, points out a number of 
experiments that lead one to question even the normative appeal of the model. Some of the 
biases that lead people to behave differently than the model would predict, Schoemaker 
suggests, may be so basic as to render the normative theory inoperational. In addition, 
many individuals persist in violating the model even when their biases are made apparent 
to them. To the extent that this is the case in the choice situation illustrated in Figure 
1, Keeney's analysis showing the incompatibility of risk aversion and risk equity (and 
ultimately the rationality of risk aversion) is based on an inappropriate normative model 
of choice. 
13The concept of independent trials is, itself, partly one of perception. For instance, the probability of 
dying from an earthquake or even a plane crash is not altogether a "group lottery" if each individual has 
some chance of survival. 
14EU theory, for example, ignores the fact that people may regret some choices more than others. 
Regret is magnified by the human tendency to think that an outcome was more predictable before it 
occurred than it actually was. This hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975) is perhaps more acute with low 
probability events. For example, there is a tendency to argue that the Chernobyl and TMI accidents 
were both fairly predictable from the evidence that was available at  the time. 
More then 30 years ago, Allais (1953) and later Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) posited that "certainty" 
in decision making played a role not anticipated by EU theory. A certain outcome is often preferred to a 
probabilistic outcome with a higher expected value. A related concept of "ambiguity" or vagueness about 
probabilities is another attribute ignored by EU theory. Recent research shows that even professional 
insurers are concerned about the certainty of the probability estimates, which helps explain why the 
insurance market for many low-probability risks (e.g., nuclear power and environmental pollution) is 
functioning so poorly in the U.S. and in Europe (Hogarth and Kunreuther, in press). Both "certainty" 
and "ambiguity" may play a role in risk aversion, e.g., the independent trials of Risk A (Figure 1) result 
in less ambiguity about the outcome (depending on the number of trials) than the lottery of Risk B. 
Risk Aversion and Citizen Choice 
Advocates of risk-neutral public choices point not only to the equity issues involved, but 
also to public misperceptions which may lead policy makers away from risk-neutral po- 
sitions. An important condition for benefit-cost calculations to reflect genuine welfare 
changes is that the affected public must be reasonably well informed about the issues 
in question. Early psychological studies shed some doubt on this condition in that the 
publics' estimates of probabilities in many risk situations, in contrast to the "experts"', 
differ markedly from actual death rates (Fischhoff, et.al (1978)). The large literature in 
cognitive psychology shows that people rely on various rules of thumb or "heuristicsn in 
making these estimates. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1983). One of the most signifi- 
cant of these heuristics is called availability, which refers to the tendency for individuals 
to think an event is more likely to occur if actual instances of the event come to mind 
readily. For example, people living in a flood plain tend to underestimate the risk if a 
flood has not occurred in recent memory; alternatively, widely reported events, such as 
a plane crash, tend to evoke the opposite response. Nearly everyone considers himself or 
herself to be better than the average driver (Svenson, 1981), which can also be explained 
by the availability heuristic in that the daily experience of driving is usually uneventful. 
Since judgements about risk are apparently often inconsistent, it is hard not to draw the 
conclusion that these judgements are inappropriate for guiding public policies. "Given our 
untrustworthy attitudesn, Treuber (1991) questions if a consent-based approach can lead 
to anything but irrational public policies. This raises our core question: Do misperceptions 
of probability and inconsistent choices involving risk, even in areas of adequate public 
information and knowledge, constitute reasonable grounds for rejecting citizen choice (as 
some aggregate of individual preferences) as a basis for public risk-affecting programs? 
There are, at least, three arguments that suggest the contrary: 
We do not demand this perceptional astuteness and consistency in other areas of 
private and public choice; 
expert judgements are also affected by these biases and heuristics; and, 
the probability estimates often do not reflect the full essence of the risk issue and 
therefore perceptional accuracy may play only a minor role. 
It is noteworthy that in no other area of individual or public choice has so much attention 
been given to the issue whether personal preferences are correct or rational. We do not 
question consumer choice on the basis that consumers do not rate the performance of 
detergents, toothpaste, or automobiles correctly, or that they are subject to 'framing' in 
the form of packaging of products? We tolerate a large amount of seeming misjudgement 
or 'irrationality' in private choices because we prize individual autonomy. We try to 
minimize this 'misjudgement' by policies that encourage honest information and truth in 
advertising, but we do not scrutinize these choices for consistency and perceptional bias. 
Benefit-cost analysis purports to  build this same individual autonomy into public policies 
by pricing public goods based on how individuals value them. 
Should we single out 'risk' as an area where individual choice should be disqualified? 
One immediate response is that risk choices are matters of 'life and death', and therefore 
inconsistency and misperceptions should not be tolerated as a basis for public policy. 
Proponents of risk neutrality sometimes point out that if the government does not pursue 
schemes that save the "cheapest" lives first, then it is responsible for the sacrifice in 
lives which this inefficiency costs (for a discussion of this "responsibility" argument, see 
Schraeder-Frechette, 1986). In this spirit, Lichtenstein, et.al. (1988, p. 5), who generally 
support public input as leading to better social decisions regarding risk, suggest that in 
certain circumstances social decision makers might in good conscience go against public 
opinion in order to make a better social decision. 
While this argument can be valid, the grounds for singling out risk as a special case 
because of the life and death nature of the decisions has less merit. The reason is that 
virtually all private and public expenditures have an opportunity cost in terms of lives 
and thus can be valued in terms of life extension, an absurd idea that would rule out 
any program that did not extend life span.15 The idea of imputing responsibility on the 
government for not allocating resources in such a way as to maximize life expectancy 
is therefore misleading by obscuring the fact that we tradeoff life expectancy for other 
amenities everyday. The extreme importance we place on human life in our "risk" choices 
may be more of a cloak for questioning the rationality for (the often anti-technology) 
risk-averse sentiments when viewed in terms of our otherwise reluctance to examine these 
same irrationalities and opportunity costs in other areas of consumer and public choice. 
A second consideration that might deter us from abandoning citizen choice in risk policy 
making is that expert estimates suffer similar perceptional biases. Challenging the notion 
that the experts have objective estimates and the public has subjective feelings, Wynne 
(1989) argues that both the experts and the lay public have perceptions influenced by 
social biases and assumptions which are usually inadvertent and implicit in technical 
analyses. The assumptions of the experts may be no better than the lay public's, in fact, 
they may be worse. In particular, the dominant perception to the risk problem takes no 
account of the differences which can exist between real world risk systems and the models 
of such practices which scientists assume in order to structure and analyze a risk problem. 
(P. 35) 
A third reservation about rejecting "incorrect or misperceived" public input is that the 
relevant probability estimates may have little to do with what people are concerned about 
in real risk situations. As expressed by Slovic (1987), although the public tends to mis- 
judge probabilities, their conceptualization of risk is often much broader and richer than 
the experts' reliance on quantitative estimates of lives, injuries and property damage. 
Research suggests that the primary correlates of public concern are not mortality or mor- 
bidity rates, but characteristics such as potentially catastrophic effects, lack of familiarity 
and understanding, involuntariness, scientific uncertainty, lack of personal control by the 
individuals exposed, risks to future generations, unclear benefits, inequitable distribution 
of risks and benefits, and potentially irreversible effects. (Slovic, et.al., 1980; Covello, 
1984). 
These qualitative risk characteristics are correlated with each other across a wide range of 
hazards. This means that risk aversion, in its many interpretations, is largely inseparable 
from other factors of the risk environment. If 'lack of control' (characteristic of collective- 
fatality risk aversion) or 'catastrophic potential' (characteristic of multiple-fatality risk 
aversion) are intertwined factors influencing how people judge the seriousness of a risk 
situation, it is difficult, if not meaningless, to make the adjustments of which Bailey speaks 
to accommodate different risk contexts. 
One concern of particular relevance to this discussion is different forms of control over 
''Moreover, this life-saving numeraire is not at all straightforward when one considers Douglas and 
Wildavsky's (1982) argument that "richer is safer". This means that the opportunity cost of public 
expenditures, if lives are the numeraire, should also take into account the loss of life expectancy resulting 
from the net reduction in personal income from directing income to public uses. Keeney (1989) has 
calculated this opportunity cost to be in the order of one life per $7 million expenditure. 
risks. Collective-fatality risk aversion may quite rationally be based on an apprehension of 
risks which individuals feel are out of their control. Wynne (1988) ties this to public trust 
in risk-controlling institutions, "judgements of the performance, attitudes, openness and 
overall 'social demeanor' of the relevant industries and regulatory bodies; .... in defining 
these factors out of the risk analysis frame, experts, consciously or not, are incorporating 
assumptions that these institutions will behave in a perfectly trustworthy manner" (p. 
35). 
It bears emphasis that this research shows that perceptions of the riskiness of situations 
that differ from the probability estimates do not always reflect an ignorance of the statis- 
tics. Risk perception research, as one of its pioneers notes (Otway, 1985), originated in 
the belief that the factors leading to 'misperceptions' could be identified and corrected. In 
spite of research findings to the contrary, conflicts about risk are still attributed to public 
misperceptions of risks and associated misunderstandings of science. The U.K. Royal So- 
ciety (1985) attributes this misunderstanding as the root cause of the objective-perceived 
risk controversy between experts and the public. 
The psychological research constitutes the most acknowledged challenge to the risk- 
neutrality prescription. A policy maker who is sensitive to public concerns cannot jus- 
tifiably base his or her policies on mortality risk irrespective of its context. Moreover, 
conflicts over technologies which have the potential for large-scale effects often appear 
to arise from conflicting evidence on the probabilities. This has led many to frame the 
'public-acceptance' issue in terms of individual, differential perceptions of the probabili- 
ties or 'hazardness', a notion that is supported by the richness of the contextual concerns 
brought to light by the risk perception studies. 
Cultural theory (see Douglas, 1978, 1982; Thompson, 1983 a, b; Gross and Rayner, 
1985; Wildavsky and Dake, 1991) challenges this thesis that differential risk perceptions 
are fundamental to societal risk conflicts. The aggregation of risk perception data, it is 
argued, has concealed underlying group phenomena that override individualistic notions of 
perception. Viewing individuals as the active organizers of their own perceptions, cultural 
theorists suggest that individuals choose what to fear in order to support their way of life 
(Douglas, 1978). Selective attention is given to risks according to cultural biases, that is, 
to worldviews or ideologies that entail deeply held values and beliefs. 
These views, the anthropologists suggest, are rooted more in social contexts than individ- 
ual perceptions of probability. People who feel that society should take more technological 
risks, even those of the LP/HC sort, can be described as patient, forbearing and orderly; 
this pro-risk personality of an obedient citizen deferential to authority fits well with the 
political culture of hierarchy. By contrast, those who perceive greater risk with respect 
to technologies and the environment consider autonomy and change important. This 
risk-averse personality holds for those who endorse egalitarianism. According to research 
by Wildavsky and Dake (1991), these cultural biases can predict risk-taking preferences 
better than measures of knowledge and at least as well as political orientation. 
Accordingly, risk-taking preferences are rooted more in social contexts than in individ- 
ual perceptions of probability and consequence. Each actor is perfectly rational, given 
his or her convictions as to how the world is. The situation is therefore one of plural 
rationalities (Schwarz and Thompson, p. 6). This theory rejects self interest, distorted 
by misperceptions of probability, as the motivating force behind policy debates. In Sen's 
(1982) terminology, individuals are committed to a world view or social ideal that goes 
beyond the utilitarian notion of self interest. According to Schwarz and Thompson, "the 
conceptual advance of cultural theory lies not in the rejection of the idea of competing 
interests, but in making it contingent upon the culturally induced biases in perception 
of policy actors who are operating within a social arena that they themselves collectively 
shape and maintainn (p.49). 
If individual interests are contingent upon cultural affiliation, what implications does 
this have for the welfare economist? Since the benefit-cost practitioner is little concerned 
about why people are willing to pay for risk reduction and can easily accept the notion 
that these preferences are socially determined and contingent upon cultural bias, cultural 
interpretations do not change the analysis. There may be some pragmatic implications, 
however, insofar as the practitioner must assert more care in obtaining a representative 
sample for the WTP measures, and extrapolations across different risks and different 
groups will be inappropriate. Viewed through a different lens, however, cultural theory 
presents a more formidable challenge to welfare economics. If preferences (and WTP 
measures) are determined more by individual adherence to different world views than by 
the actual benefits or costs of a policy in question, the BCA model may be less useful. 
The reason is that the conflicting groups may not accept a welfare concept based on the 
potential for a Pareto improvement when they feel strongly and morally committed to a 
position far beyond their personal risks or disbenefits. The welfare criteria may not be 
an acceptable policy criteria when debates are so polarized that conflicting groups view 
each other's preferences as unreasonable. 
A Policy Example 
The transport of very hazardous materials through densely populated areas is a topical 
and contentious policy area, and one characterized by LP/HC risks. As early as 1976, the 
City of New York banned the road transport of large-quantity shipments of radioactive 
materials through the city. Five years later, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) 
published a Final Rule (HM 164) which allowed the shipment by road throughout the 
nation of all types of radioactive materials. One avowed purpose of this rule was to 
override local prohibitions against such shipments. 
New York City challenged HM-164 on the basis that DOT misjudged the significance 
of the unlikely possibility of a catastrophic accident. Relying mainly on estimates from 
the Sandia report,16 According to one study (SANDIA, 1980), the most lethal credible 
accident was one involving plutonium shipments, which could cause an estimated 5 early 
fatalities, 1800 latent cancer fatalities, and 290 early morbidities, but only with the very 
low probability of around one in a million. This estimate, however, excluded the possibility 
of sabotage, which another report crudely estimated could result in as many as a million 
latent cancer fatalities. DOT claimed that HM-164 would have no significant impact on 
the human environment. This excluded the Department from preparing an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and from the 1978 "Research and Worst Casen regulation of the Council on Environmental 
Quality17 (CEQ), which required an agency confronted with unavoidable uncertainty to 
include a worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its 
occ~rrence. '~  
The District Court upheld New York City's challenge on the basis of the large uncer- 
tainties in the probability estimates, especially insofar as the SANDIA analysis did not 
adequately take into account human error and sabotage, and the gravity of the potential 
16The Nuclear Regulatory Agency also published a risk assessment with similar estimates (NRC, 1977). 
1 7 ~ h e  Council on Environmental Quality assigns binding procedures for compliance with NEPA. 
1840 C.F.R., Section 1502.22. 
consequences. Judge Sofaer acknowledged that "significance depends on the estimation 
of the credible consequences discounted by their improbability", yet, he went on to state 
that in some circumstances "significance will depend heavily on the gravity of the poten- 
tial consequences, for some consequences are so grave that, however unlikely, their mere 
"credibility" makes the impact of an agency action significant. (Sofaer, 1982, p. 53) 
If "mere credibility" of a disastrous consequence is significant, then this statement is 
a clear rejection of an expected-value rule or of risk neutrality.lg Judge Sofaer justifies 
this position on the grounds that adhering to an expected-value rule bypasses any con- 
sideration of public concern about catastrophic events. In his opinion, DOT unjustifiably 
dismissed public concern as unwarranted. 
Judge Sofaer's decision was reversed by the Appeals Court.20 In the words of the Appeals 
Court judge, "Disquieting as it may be even to contemplate such matters", DOT'S decision 
that a remote possibility even of a serious accident does not pose a significant risk for 
the human environment "cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion" (Newman, 1982, 
p. 41). According to a dissenting judge, however, "Given the 'unique (and) unknown 
risks' associated with and the 'highly controversial' nature of nuclear waste transport", 
the DOT decision was "arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law", 21 (Oakes, 
1982, p.5). 
This case encapsulates the controversy and judicial insecurity regarding the treatment 
of LP/HC events. In fact, several earlier court cases had set opposing legal precedents 
regarding the interpretation of NEPA and the CEQ regulation,22 In one notable case,23 it 
was ruled that no limitations should be recognized on the remoteness of the probability or 
on the speculative nature of the data associated with catastrophic events. This was clearly 
moving away from a risk-neutral position. This oscillation in judicial interpretations of 
the National Environmental Policy Act and the drift of some courts away from a 'rule 
of reason', i.e., risk neutrality, led the CEQ to amend its regulation in 1986 such that 
only known or reasonably foreseeable consequences are considered in an Environmental 
Impact Statement.24 By this revision, the CEQ clearly intended to rescind the prior 
duty of agencies to consider remote and conjectural consequences of major projects thus 
moving away from risk aversion toward more risk-neutral reasoning (Weiss, 1988). 
Although closely intertwined with other issues, especially questions of what scientific 
191t is perhaps of interest that this 'expected value rule' was not new to the courts. It was introduced 
into judicial interpretations of tort law as early as the 1920's by Judge Learned Hand who gave the 
standard for negligent conduct a simple mathematical interpretation: risk is expressed as the product of 
probability times consequences. Provided the product remains constant, an accident with low probability 
and high consequences is weighted equally in assessing liability with an accident with high probability 
and low consequences (see Yellin (1977) p. 982). 
20Based on an earlier Supreme Court decision (Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. vs. Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Vermont Yankee IV), 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983), which emphasized that courts should be 
deferential where an agency is making predictions within its area of special expertise (at the frontiers of 
science), the only role for the court was to  ensure that the agency, in this case the DOT, had taken a 
'hard look' a t  the environmental consequences. 
21Cornmenting on this case, Henry (1986) argues that by allowing the DOT to avoid a worst case 
analysis required by the CEQ regulations, the Appeals Court "created a hole in NEPA large enough to 
drive a truckload of radioactive waste throughn (p.565). 
22See, for example, Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.29 957 (5th Cir, 1983). 
23Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1984). 
24The worst case analysis requirement was replaced by a 'threshold of reasonably foreseeable impacts 
based on credible scientific evidence' While worse case analysis focuses first on exposing the potential 
types of consequences of a federal action and then on determining their likelihood, the "credible scien- 
tific evidence" threshold concentrates on the uncertain probability of a known or reasonably foreseeable 
consequence. (Weiss, 1988. p.817). 
evidence is permissible regarding very low probability events,25 the issue of risk neutral- 
ity was central to the NYC case and more generally to U.S. legislative history dealing 
with LP/HC events. Given estimates of low probabilities and grave consequences, the 
underlying issue is whether an expected-value rule should be adhered to in view of the 
public's concerns about catastrophic accidents. DOT was clearly against weighing public 
concern or public risk aversion in its considerations. The public, DOT stated, is incapable 
of rationally appraising the consequences of accidents; it tends to be disproportionately 
influenced by potentially large consequences (Federal Register, 1980). The Agency ex- 
pressed its explicit view that, where it finds public concern unjustified, it will refuse to 
regulate with a view to relieving this concern.26 Moreover, DOT blamed irrational public 
anxiety as responsible for actions such as New York City's transport ban which tended 
to show local governments to be unfit to legislate in this area. 
Not all U.S. agencies take such an explicit risk-neutral position. Recognizing how essen- 
tial public acceptance is to its future, the nuclear power industry has explicitly addressed 
the quantification of public risk aversion. Exponential weighing functions on consequences 
with multiple, simultaneous fatalities are most often discussed (Farmer, 1967; Wilson, 
1975; Ferreira and Slesin, 1976; Griesmeyer and Okrent, 1980; Higson, 1986). Another 
approach is to set absolute levels on the acceptability of individual and societal risks, 
regardless of the costs of avoiding them.27 Many propose that these acceptability limits 
be more stringent for risks with catastrophic consequences (Versteeg, 1986; Levine, 1980). 
This form of risk aversion has been adopted in the safety targets of the U.S. Nuclear Reg- 
ulatory Agency28 and proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (Niehaus, 
1987). In the Netherlands, risk aversion has been formalized in legislation dealing with 
safety targets for industrial facilities. 
By explicitly stating that it would refuse to regulate with a view to relieving public con- 
cern if it found this concern unwarranted, DOT disregarded public risk-averse preferences 
in favor of a more risk-neutral position. This position violates the principles underlying 
benefit-cost analysis, most importantly that public preferences should guide public poli- 
cies. DOT'S paternalistic position raises an important question: At the most fundamental 
level, might there be some areas where the public would reject the principles underlying 
BCA in favor of a more paternalistic model of social choice? Might there be concerns and 
preferences which an individual holds on a personal level that he or she would not wish to 
affect public policy? As Lichtenstein, et .al. (1989) query, are there circumstances where 
25For a good discussion of how agencies should deal with uncertainties in risk estimates, see Finkel 
(1990). 
2 6 D O ~ ,  Summary of comments, DOT Motion, EX. E, pt.H.4.at 4. 
2 7 ~ h e  U.K. Health and Safety Executive suggests that acceptability for major societal risks can be 
estimated from risks that appear to  be accepted in society. For instance, the industrial installations at 
Canvey Island were calculated to pose a risk of about 1 in 5000 per annum of a major accident causing 
more than 1500 casualties. When the Thames Barrier was built, the design specification insisted that 
the chances of its being overtopped by a freak tide should be less than 1 in 1000 per annum, which is 
the predicted approximate annual chance of an aircraft crash somewhere in the UK killing 500 or more 
people. According to the HSE, this suggests that society requires the risk of major accidents to  be less 
than 1 in 1000 and if possible less than 1 in 5000 (U.K. Health and Safety Executive, 1987, p.24). 
28The NRC safety goals set quantitative safety objectives only for the risk of prompt fatality to  the 
average individual within a mile of a plant site boundary, which was equivalent to  an average individual 
risk of death of 5 t i r n e ~ l o - ~ .  After Chernobyl, which surprised the nuclear community with its few 
immediate fatalities, there was concern that this individual risk figure would permit an accident frequency 
that was too high. This risk aversion led the NRC to establish an additional safety guideline of 1 in 1 
million per year frequency for large releases of radioactive materials from nuclear power plants (see 
Whipple and Starr, 1989). 
social decision makers might, in good conscience, go against public opinion (as motivated 
by self interest) in order to make a better social decision? 
These questions raise a number of issues that have been addressed extensively by 
economists and philosophers. Libertarians, for instance, consider the economic welfare 
paradigm as inappropriate for social choices on a number of grounds, but most basically 
because the Kaldor-Hicks criterion permits uncompensated losers (Kneese, 1991). Indeed, 
libertarians liken the governments' mandate to redistribute between winners and losers 
in environmental policy making with socialism and centralized planning. Sagoff (1993) 
recommends instead that policy be directed by a more explicit respect of property rights. 
In the New York City case, this would suggest that radioactive shipments are unaccept- 
able unless those exposed to the risks are compensated adequately. Libertarians are not 
the only ones opposed to uncompensated risk imposition, however. In an early paper on 
this subject, Schulze and Kneese (1980) examined three ethical systems in addition to 
the libertarian and concluded that even in those cases where the benefits clearly outweigh 
the costs, each of the ethical systems (in contrast to that of BCA) reject uncompensated 
risks at least some of the time. 
In advocating the protection of property rights for motivating environmental policy, 
Sagoff rejects the notion that preferences should play the dominant role in public policy. 
If government protects property rights or the status quo, and does not respond to the 
preferences and tastes of the public, this implies a more paternalistic view of public policy 
making which characterizes most European policy processes. Kopp (1993) rightly notes 
that the issue can only be decided as an individual value issue: "Are we more willing to 
live with our mistakes than we are willing to give up our freedom to make mistakes?" 
(P-12) 
A more long-standing critique of the utilitarian basis of BCA is based on the rejection of 
self-interested preferences for determining public policy. Consider, for example, a person 
with an aversion to spiders, who is observed as killing each and every spider he encounters. 
From this behavior one can infer that spiders rank rather low in this person's utility. Yet, 
he may recognize the ecological importance of spiders and not wish that his personal 
preference for killing all spiders influences public policy; in fact, he may be opposed to 
a public policy that eradicates spiders. In the words of Sen (1982), this person has a 
commitment to spiders beyond his personal preference, and this commitment will not be 
reflected in his actual personal choices (and thus not in his derived utility f~nc t ion) .~ '  
Whether or not these social preferences factor into the benefit-cost ledger will depend on 
whether an attempt is made to solicit them directly, e.g. willingness to pay to eradicate 
spiders, or whether the social preferences are a summation of preferences derived from 
personal behavior. 
The other side of this issue is not the inclusion of altruistic, social concerns, but the ex- 
clusion of preferences that are deemed asocial or immoral, for example, based on jealousy 
or racial prejudices. Sen also addresses this issue, concluding that noone would suggest 
that all preferences are morally acceptable. Judgements therefore must be made about 
what should and what should not count in the ledger, or as Mishan (p.165) rather chau- 
vinistically puts it, "what men of good will regard as reasonable". With a little reflection, 
it seems apparent that benefit-cost practitioners cannot operate fully on the premise that 
every effect on individual utility should be included in the analysis. 
The dilemma is that where issues are strongly polarized and where underlying values on 
291n an early paper, Harsanyi (1955) raised the possible distinction between a persons subjective pref- 
erences, which are motivated by self interest only, and his ethical preferences, which express impersonal 
social considerations. 
the direction of society are at stake, there may be little social agreement or consensus on 
what views are reasonable or moral. Cultural theory proposes that "reasonableness" or 
"rationalityn is very closely tied to social relationships and corresponding adherence to 
different myths of nature. Underlying any judgement on the reasonableness of preferences 
for benefit-cost purposes, therefore, is a judgement of what preferences are sanctioned by 
the organization doing the calculations. Thus, we find analyses which adjust for the 
risk context by adding factors for social disruption, for the pain and suffering caused to 
others and the age of the victims. Some studies find it 'reasonable' to adjust (usually 
arbitrarily) for the catastrophic potential. But these adjustments would be dismissed as 
trivial by egalitarians who might consider this same catastrophic risk as vastly more than 
social disruption, perhaps as one event in a chain of possible calamities that signal the 
breakdown of social/ecological systems-a contingency that must be avoided at all costs. 
Where such polarization exists, what can be the role of benefit-cost analysis? Recog- 
nizing that the analyst cannot avoid making judgements about what to include in the 
analysis, the authority and effectiveness of BCA will depend ultimately on the trustwor- 
t hiness and reputation of the political institution doing the assessing. This trust is waning. 
As Jasanoff (1991) observes, there is a growing reluctance for powerful social actors to 
accept expert knowledge as the basis for their political assessments of risk. Because of 
scientific pluralism, and also because of the relatively non-hierarchical organization of 
science as well as politics in the U.S., different constructions of risk often enter the de- 
bates. As a case in point, when a dissenting judge in the NYC case was presented with 
seemingly cut-and-dried evidence for risk neutrality in the form of comparisons of days 
of life lost from, eg., remaining unmarried, smoking a pack of cigarettes a day and the 
transportation of radioactive materials, he responded that "quantifications such as these 
are absurdn (Oakes, p.4). This comment reflects the polarized risk constructions apparent 
in the public debate. 
Despite Judge Sofaer's misgivings, DOT'S risk-neutral stance cannot be faulted on pro- 
cedural or legal grounds; however it may prove to be short sighted. As Wynne (1983) has 
argued, the authority and effectiveness of government policies for regulating and man- 
aging hazardous activities (and the effectiveness of formal analyses) often founder upon 
disagreements about risks. These disagreements have led to a disturbing loss of public 
confidence in regulatory institutions, which means that their viability may depend as 
much on building public trust as in managing risks efficiently. This will at a minimum 
require a meaningful dialogue with public groups and a sincere effort to accommodate 
public concerns. 
Where trust and legitimacy are threatened and analytical expertise challenged, a BCA 
can probably contribute little to building a stable social consensus. To quote Mishan 
one last time: "It follows that there will be many issues in the formulation of economic 
policies which cannot call for guidance on a welfare economics that raises itself only 
on those ethical premises sanctioned by (benefit-cost analysis) ... it should be clear that 
while some issues of economic policy are fit subjects for welfare economics, it has little to 
contribute to other issuesn (p.166). Commenting more generally on social choice theories 
(including the economists' welfare theory), Sen (1 986) also stresses the importance of 
recognizing the heterogeneity of different types of social issues and choices and the folly 
of applying any given set of complete ideas to all types (p. 238). 
This does not mean that benefit-cost analysis does not have a role in controversial 
LP/HC cases. Agencies can rely on it to support and justify their policy decisions by 
explicitly bringing in public concerns. But the analyses will necessarily include agency 
judgements, from framing the issues to screening the preferences for 'reasonableness', 
and these judgements will naturally reflect the goals and interests of the agencies doing 
the analyses. The advantage of the benefit-cost methodology is that it makes these 
judgements more transparent and open to public scrutiny. Its usefulness then rests on its 
contribution to the political debate and process, but not on it serving as a by-pass to this 
process.30 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have addressed the priority our social decision makers should place on 
preventing or reducing the consequences of potentially disastrous events that will occur 
with very low frequency. The question I pose is whether risk neutrality, where the social 
objective is to reduce the loss of life as efficiently as possible given competing demands 
on resources, should be a guiding principle even if individuals often deviate from this 
objective in their personal choices? At  the core of this issue lies a fundamental question: 
To what extent, under which circumstances, and how should individual preferences count 
as legitimate input for public policy? 
While there is always room for improvement in the public understanding of technical 
risks, and admittedly most people are poor estimators of probabilities, I have argued that 
this should not disqualify informed public preferences as influencing "life and limb" policy 
decisions. Even contemplating the loss of life that deviations from risk neutrality implies, 
this does not warrant exceptional treatment of such decisions since, in fact, all allocative 
decisions have an opportunity cost in terms of human lives. Another argument for not 
disqualifying public concern in favor of "expert objectivity" is that the expert estimates 
of low probability events are also subject to heuristics and analytical biases. Finally, the 
probability estimates may not constitute the essence of the hazard situation for many 
people, and therefore public decisions should be based on more than the death count. 
In the words of Judge Sofaer, "Public reaction is a manifestation of collective wisdom 
based on human experience. It should not be lightly dismissed as unscientific" (Sofaer, 
1982, p.76). That DOT labeled public concerns a s  "irrational", or "as disqualifying local 
governments to legislate in these areasn, may ultimately reduce DOT'S authority in future 
routing or other risk issues. This may lead to further polarization, and, in so doing, distort 
and impoverish the policy-making process. 
As for catastrophe avoidance, there is ample evidence that "catastrophic potentialn is 
so closely linked to other psychological dimensions of concern such as feelings of personal 
control and social equity, that risk aversion cannot be attributed solely to an aversion 
against fatalities in large numbers. My argument against risk neutrality, or for public 
risk-averse preferences serving as a legitimate input to benefit-cost calculations, begs 
however the question whether benefit-cost analysis is an appropriate criterion on which 
to base public policy on controversial risk issues. If, as cultural theory suggests, individual 
preferences for risk-mitigating policies are determined more by social affiliation and cul- 
tural biases than by survival interests, then it is doubtful that the Kaldor-Hicks principle 
underlying benefit-cost calculations can be a socially-acceptable, normative criterion for 
valuing public policies, at least to the extent that the disparate preferences are viewed as 
"unreasonablen or "irrational". In these cases, Mishan appears correct in his assessment 
30Hardly any major environmental statutes require explicit estimates of benefits and costs. Moreover, 
although the role of BCA has been strengthened by executive orders mandating that benefit-cost analysis 
accompany any new proposed or final regulations, regulatory agencies have often resisted (Freeman and 
Portney, 1989). 
that if we base our social choices purely on utility, they will run into ethical objections 
and lose credibility. 
This means simply that benefit-cost reasoning cannot and should not be the final word 
in mitigating or reducing LP/HC risks, but it can be an important part of the debate. 
If the analytical judgements are made explicit, a benefit-cost analysis has the advantage 
of openly addressing public concerns and public risk aversion as well as exposing the 
opportunity costs of risk-averse policies. As I argued with regards to the controversial issue 
of transporting radioactive materials through New York City, analyses which explicitly 
address public concerns may be more appropriate than uncritically accepting a position of 
risk neutrality. Society's system for managing risks to life and limb is not then flawed by 
deviations from risk neutrality, but this system is flawed if citizens' concerns are ignored 
or deemed irrational. 
APPENDIX I 
The amount a person is willing to pay to reduce his or her mortality risk can be illustrated 
with the simple indifference curve shown in Figure 2. In this figure, a person's wealth (W) 
is shown on the vertical axis and his or her probability of dying from the cause in question 
(PD) is shown on the horizontal axis. The indifference curve (I) represents combinations 
of W and PD that have the same utility. The person represented in Figure 2 would be 
willing to pay a maximum amount of W1 - W2 to reduce the risk from 1/1000 to zero, 
and thus suffer no loss in utility. This "willingness to payn corresponds to the concept of 
"compensating variation" (CV), defined as the money transfer necessary, following some 
economic change, to maintain the individual's welfare at its original level. 
Figure 3: An Indifference Curve for Wealth and Fatality Risk. 
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